Although commentators have been interested in Hobbes's Objections, 6 many view them as uncharitable or incoherent. For example, Tom Sorrell argues that Hobbes "seems to miss [Descartes's] point" in his Fourth Objection, claiming that "Hobbes does not see that it is the objectivity of conception rather than the process of conception with which Descartes is concerned." 7 However, as I show, the objectivity of conception and the process of conception are necessarily simultaneous projects for
Hobbes. He cannot address one without the other because, unlike Descartes, who posited a faculty of the intellect in the Meditations, Hobbes did not believe that such a faculty was consistent with mechanical philosophy. Conjecturing the existence of the intellect and describing its activity as "perceiving" the nature of the wax was, to Hobbes, positing an uninformative black box.
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My argument proceeds in three stages. First, I discuss Descartes's Second Meditation on the nature of the wax alongside Hobbes's Fourth Objection. I show that the crux of their disagreement is not about language, as might appear to be the case, but rather the distinction between imagining and conceiving spurred by Hobbes's rejection of a faculty psychology. Next, I examine what I call Hobbes's mechanical epistemology, in which we have scientific knowledge (scientia) without an intellect. I argue that Hobbes's work outside of the Objections replaces the intellect with conceiving, which is precisely the mechanical activity of the mind that figures prominently in his Fourth Objection, and that Hobbes's mechanical epistemology and philosophical psychology should be understood as providing a mechanism to make scientific knowledge mechanically intelligible. 9 Finally, I revisit the Fourth Objection and argue 6 For example, Alanen (2003, 119) ; Lennon (1974) ; Mori (2012) . 7 Sorell (1995, 88) . For similar criticisms, see Costa (1983, 544) . Curley defends Hobbes's understanding of the Second Meditation but finds Hobbes "at his most dogmatic" in a later Objection (1995, 104; see Duncan 2005, 446-447 , for criticism of this latter point).
8 Clarke (2003, 9; cf. 35ff ) views Descartes's appeal to mental faculties in the Meditations, compared with his natural-philosophical work on the human body before the Meditations, as a non-explanatory stopping point that should be seen as a "provisional halt" of explanation, not as some in-principle limit. 9 Rather than seeing Hobbes as having supplanted the active intellect with language (cf. Leijenhorst 2001, 94) , on my account conceiving replaces the active intellect. For more discussion on language replacing the intellect, see Leijenhorst (2007, 97) and Pettit (2008, 29) . that Hobbes's work on conceiving in the late 1630s and early 1640s expands upon the mechanism briefly summarized in the Fourth Objection.
The Wax in the Second Meditation and Hobbes's Objection

"Tak[ing] off the clothes, as it were": Descartes's Method and the Wax
The wax example provides the final step toward the Second Meditation's goal of clarifying the nature of the mind (Wagner 1995) ; it demonstrates the ability of the intellect to perceive independently of the imagination. It also paves the way for the use of substance in the Third Meditation (Curley 1986, 163-164) . The meditator concludes from this example that bodies are "perceived ... by the intellect alone"
(AT VII.34; CSM II.22), not by the imagination or the senses.
The meditator focuses upon "one particular body," the piece of wax, since perceptions of bodies in general are likely to be confused (AT VII.30; CSM II.20) . He notes that when the wax is placed near a fire, there are changes in the features of the wax that are perceived by the senses, but the wax still remains wax. The meditator next takes "away everything which does not belong to the wax" and discovers that extended, flexible, and changeable remain. He then asks whether flexibility and changeability are akin to changing "a square shape to a triangular shape" in the imagination (AT VII.31; CSM II.20). However, the wax has the potential to undergo an "immeasurable number of changes," so there is a qualitative difference between changing a square into a triangle in the imagination and understanding the wax as flexible and changeable. As a result, the mediator's understanding of the wax cannot have come from the limited faculty of the imagination (AT VII.31; CSM II.21).
The meditator next wonders which perception of the nature of the wax is more perfect-that which he knew from his sensory perceptions of it with the imagination or that which resulted when he examined it closely by "tak[ing] the clothes off, as it were, and consider [ing] it naked" (AT VII.32; CSM II.22). He concludes that this closer examination is a more perfect perception of the nature of the wax.
This denuding of the idea of the wax, the meditator declares, is done only by the intellect, and so the meditator determines that the "intellect alone" perceives bodies (AT VII.34; CSM II.22).
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Little is said in the Second Meditation about the process whereby the meditator is able to "take away everything which does not belong to the wax" (AT VII.31; CSM II.20). Marion (1999, 59-60) Regardless, when he wrote his Fourth objection, Hobbes would have had access only to the metaphor of removing clothing and Descartes's claims about the intellect's ability to "perceive."
Hobbes's Objection: Conceiving versus Perceiving and Reasoning as the "Linking of Names"
As previously mentioned, Hobbes misquotes the wax example by using conceive (concipere) rather than perceive (percipere): "I must therefore admit that the nature of this piece of wax is in no way revealed by my imagination, but is conceived [concipere] by the mind alone" (AT VII.177; CSM II.125). We shall see that Hobbes's usage of concipere is unsurprising given his mechanical account of the mind in the 1630s and 1640s, in which concipere is a term of art used to describe the process by which the mind (1) represents external bodies with conceptions, and (2) inspects its conceptions to learn about the natures of the things in the world that cause those conceptions. 10 Gassendi criticizes this metaphor in his Objections to the Meditations (AT VII. [271] [272] and later in his Rebuttals (1644 Rebuttals ( /1972 , arguing that whatever this method may be, "the bare substance ... will always retain its hidden quality" (1644/1972, 198) . Similarly, Hobbes holds that we never know substance, since just as we have no idea of God, "we do not have an idea of substance" (Ninth Objection; AT VII.185; CSM II.131). 11 See Garber (1992, 42) . Curley (1978, 45) Hobbes 1973, 126) . In this section, I lay out the explanatory scope and power of Hobbes's view that conceptions in our minds are simply motions in the brain caused by bodies outside of us and our bodies' reaction against those motions.
The account of the mind in Elements of Law could not be more radical. Hobbes rejects all traditional distinctions between the faculties of the imagination and of the intellect, and he further avoids appealing to any inner sense such as a common sense. 13 Hobbes's psychology has only two "powers of the mind": cognitive and motive. Hobbes explains the cognitive power thus:
[T]here be in our minds continually certain images or conceptions of the things without us, insomuch that if a man could be alive, and all the rest of the world annihilated, he should nevertheless retain the image thereof, and of all those things which he had before seen and perceived in it; every man by his own experience knowing that the However, Descartes misunderstands Hobbes's emphasis on language. For Hobbes, inferences in language themselves tell us nothing about things; instead, we must examine the conceptions in the imagination that are signified by the names in the inferences. I criticize the conventionalist interpretation of Hobbes in my paper "Hobbes, Definitions, and Simplest Conceptions" (Adams forthcoming). 13 See Leijenhorst (2007, 96-97, fn. 63-64) for discussion of these aspects in Leviathan and De corpore.
absence or destruction of things once imagined, doth not cause the absence or destruction of the imagination itself. (EL I.8) 14 Hobbes's conceptions are images caused by motions from bodies outside of us, which motions "proceed from the actions of the thing itself, whereof it is the conception" (EL I.2). These motions "reboundeth back into the nerves outward, and thence it becometh an apparition without" (EL II.9). 15 In his early notes for De corpore (c. 1637), Hobbes likens the mind to a mirror: "The mind of man is a mirror capable of receiving the representation and image of all the world" (ms. 5297; Hobbes 1973, 449) . 16 Moreover,
Hobbes uses conception as synonymous with idea-as he does later in De corpore I.3 (OL I.4).
Instead of positing separate cognitive faculties, Hobbes distinguishes sense and imagination by whether or not there is an external object presently causing the motion in the brain as well as according to the strength of the motion; there is no qualitative difference between sense and imagination. In sensing, the object is present and the motion from it is strongest (EL II.2), while in imagining, the object is absent and the motion is decayed (EL III.1). Likewise, dreams (EW III.3), mental fictions (EW III.4), and memory 17 (EW III.6-7) are all explained by lingering motions that combine in diverse ways.
Hobbes also avoids any appeal to separate cognitive faculties when he explains how we know that color is not a property of bodies. Qualities such as color appear because of our body's reaction as it receives motions from bodies. In correspondence written in 1636, Hobbes explains to William Cavendish (Newcastle) that "color [is] but an effect of that motion in the brain" (Hobbes 1994, 38) . Without a faculty of the intellect to judge sensations and determine their veracity, Hobbes argues that it is only through the senses themselves that we can correct deceptions such as thinking that color is a property of bodies:
And this is the great deception of sense, which also is by sense to be corrected. For as sense telleth me, when I see directly, that the colour seemeth to be in the object; so also sense telleth me, when I see by reflection, that colour is not in the object. (EL II.10)
We are deceived if we take color to be a property of bodies, but when we attend to our experience of things such as mirrors, we are able to see our error. Hobbes's strange argument from seeing a reflection in a mirror goes as follows. An image in a mirror appears to be blue, but we know that "the image of any thing seen by reflection ... is not any thing in or behind the glass" (EL II.6). Since a mirror is blue at one moment and not at another, we infer by attending to this sensory experience that blue is not in the mirror, that is, being blue is not part of the mirror's nature. Hobbes thinks this is so clear that "every man may prove [it] to himself" (EL II.6).
This argument would have been unconvincing to anyone who held that vision occurs by means of species propagated through media. Indeed, Hobbes articulates a simplified version of the species view as his target: "the introduction of species visible and intelligible ... passing to and fro from the object, is worse than any paradox, ... [it is] a plain impossibility" (EL II.4). Hobbes's assertion that anyone who encounters a mirror will understand that color is obviously not a property of objects clearly does not establish the impossibility of the species view; neither do his other arguments in Elements of Law.
Rather, we should understand Hobbes as showing the explanatory scope of the mechanical mind hypothesis insofar as it can account for such visual phenomena without any appeal to entities such as species that were, in Hobbes's view, not mechanically intelligible.
Anti-White XXVII.19 (1642-43) provides support for understanding this to be Hobbes's strategy.
There he emphasizes all that can be explained without any recourse to an incorporeal mover, in this case, the soul:
[E]very perception is a motion in the parts of an animal's body; these, though they are called 'animal spirits' and 'vital spirits', are nevertheless [themselves] bodies; and the motion is aroused by objects, which are also bodies. So up to now we need to have no recourse to an incorporeal mover. (Hobbes 1973, 326; Hobbes 1976, 331) 18
Hobbes later repeats this final phrase in Anti-White XXVII, when showing that he can also explain the presence and lingering of conceptions without appeal to an incorporeal mover. Furthermore, as in
Elements of Law, Hobbes holds in Anti-White that animal motion and the intention to accomplish a goal can also be explained with such a mechanical explanation, without needing to appeal to anything incorporeal (Hobbes 1976, 332) . Although undoubtedly unsatisfying to those holding the species view,
Hobbes viewed the strength of his mechanical hypothesis of the mind as the scope of the phenomena it could explain.
From the Mechanical Mind to Mechanical Epistemology: Stages 3 and 5 of the Mechanism
Conceptions and Language
Some commentators have focused on Hobbes's nominalism. 19 Hobbes is interested in names in his writings from the 1640s onward; indeed, in Elements of Law he claims that only names are universal and that universals are found nowhere in nature (EL V.5-6), a view he also endorses in Anti-White II.6 (1973, 112 However, as we shall see, Hobbes's analysis shows that scientific knowledge is more than merely knowing how to use names. Marks and names are important only as the means by which we engage in reasoning; they are the means by which we organize our "remembrances" (EL VI.1). Indeed, Hobbes allows for a personal mark to be any sensible object, such as a rock left in a certain place to warn of an upcoming danger at sea (EL V.1), and not merely a verbal mark or name. Indeed, instead of words, humans could have used different colored rocks as personal marks and then also as public names.
Furthermore, there is no language of thought for Hobbes. Instead, the orderly succession of conceptions, not names or marks, constitutes the "discourse of the mind" (EL IV.1). In Anti-White,
Hobbes rejects Thomas White's view that words "reflect the mind":
"Words," he says on his page 32, "reflect the mind." (We note, by the way, that this is utterly ridiculous, for what resemblance can there be, pray, between a word and the mind? And how is it that, if "words reflect the mind," the languages of all nations are not alike, as their minds are?) (Hobbes 1973, 126; Hobbes 1976, 53) Here Hobbes introduces truth and evidence to clarify scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge is "evidence of truth, from some beginning or principle of sense" (EL VI.4). Truth is a property of propositions, and the truth of a proposition depends upon whether, in the case of an affirmative proposition, the name in the predicate "comprehendeth" the name in the subject (EL V.10). 21 The truth of the proposition "charity is a virtue" (Hobbes's example) thus depends upon whether the name virtue comprehends the name charity. 22 Since it does, the proposition is true.
Evidence provides a reason to believe that the conclusion of a syllogism is true. Evidence is about the relationship of a name to a conception:
[Evidence] is the concomitance of a man's conception with the words that signify such conception in the act of ratiocination. For when a man reasoneth with his lips only, to which the mind suggesteth only the beginning, and followeth not the words of his mouth with the conceptions of his mind ... though he begin his ratiocination with true propositions, and proceed with perfect syllogisms, and thereby make always true conclusions; yet are not his conclusions evident to him, for want of the concomitance of conception with his words. For if the words alone were sufficient, a parrot might be taught as well to know a truth, as to speak it. (EL VI.3) Examining one's conceptions to be sure that the words used in reasoning signify those conceptions is what distinguishes scientific knowledge from mere knowledge of sense (EL VI.4). Such examination 21 Hobbes understands one name comprehending another to be a containment relation. In the Elements of Logick, Du Moulin connects mathematical containment with relations between subjects and attributes in logic: "that which in the Mathematicks is said, to containe, in Logick is said, to be attributed" (1624, 122), and he illustrates this logical relationship by appeal to relationships among numbers, such as that "[t]welve containeth six, and six containeth three, therefore twelve containeth three" (1624, 124). Hobbes uses a nearly identical example in De corpore 7.9 (OL I.86-87) to talk about how larger numbers are compounded (componere) out of smaller ones. 22 In the discussion that follows, I italicize names and render conceptions in capitals.
provides evidence that the conclusions of syllogisms are actually true and not accidentally so-the latter being what Hobbes describes in the case of the individual who reasons perfectly well but whose conclusions, like those of a parrot, "are not... evident to him." A parrot can "speak" a true conclusion, but this will be accidental.
We discover that one conception comprehends another conception-and thus gain evidenceby finding a genus-species relationship: the genus conception comprehends the species conception.
How do we discover this genus-species relationship when only imagistic conceptions are in the mind?
We do so by first discovering which more general conceptions constitute a particular conception when they are compounded together (componere). We do this by calling to mind the image available and then seeing which more general conceptions always co-occur when we inspect that particular conception and resolve (resolvere) it into these general conceptions. In later works such as De corpore, Hobbes refers to these two activities of resolving and compounding as analysis and synthesis (OL I.61-62) and also as subtracting and adding (OL I.3).
We find these two cognitive activities in the early notes for De corpore (c. 1637), where Hobbes claims that the individual left behind after the annihilation of the world would "subtract and compound" conceptions (Hobbes 1973, 449) . In De corpore 6.2, when we consider the conception MAN, we discover through analysis and synthesis that MAN is "compounded" from the genus conceptions FIGURATE, ANIMATE, and RATIONAL (OL I.59-60), because whenever we resolve MAN through analysis, these genus conceptions arise. We then reconstruct MAN back together in synthesis in our mind. Hobbes's process of mental compounding or adding together is simplistic, something like FIGURATE + ANIMATE + RATIONAL = MAN. Knowing that ANIMATE is part of MAN confirms that the genus conception ANIMATE comprehends MAN and provides evidence of the truth of "man is animate." If one discovers that a name used in a proposition does not signify a conception (e.g., an absurdity like incorporeal substance), then one knows that that proposition cannot be true.
Names also help us remember necessary connections among conceptions, or what Hobbes
refers to as the "necessary coherence" of conceptions. He argues that "the invention of names hath been necessary for the drawing of men out of ignorance, by calling to their remembrance the necessary coherence of one conception to another" (EL V.13). By "necessary coherence," Hobbes does not mean the association of conceptions with one another through constant accidental occurrence. For example, with a limited set of experiences, the conception RED HAIR might become associated with the conception MAN. For Hobbes, this type of association would not be necessary, since we can readily find instances of MAN without instances of RED HAIR. Instead, Hobbes's reference to necessary coherence means that we discover that there are containment relationships among our conceptions, which we then signify by using names in propositions.
The Activity of Philosophizing
Beyond the role that conceptions have in providing evidence, the subject matter of philosophy itself also consists of conceptions and only indirectly things in the world. Indeed, in the early notes for
De corpore (c. 1637), we find that when we reason "we compute nothing but our phantasms or ideas" (Hobbes 1973, 450 ; cf. OL I.82). In Anti-White XXVII.1, Hobbes argues that philosophy should concern only those things that are conceivable, or imaginable (imaginabile), so we will not even offer definitions for things that we cannot imagine, such as incorporeal substance (Hobbes 1973, 312) . Because philosophy deals only with things that are imaginable, such as animals and trees, it follows that things of which we cannot have a conception, such as God or angels, are excluded from philosophy.
Given the constraint of conceivability, philosophizing involves examining conceptions in order to learn the natures of the bodies in the world that cause those conceptions. As a result, Hobbes's first philosophy ignores many traditional metaphysical topics, such as the existence and eternality of the soul or the existence of God, since these fall outside of the conceivable. 23 Instead, Hobbesian first philosophy seeks to "understand the beginning of the teaching of nature" (OL I.81) and thus inaugurate a first philosophy that will be useful for the natural philosopher.
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We discover a thing's nature by the same mental activity we employ when determining whether a given name comprehends another name. The only difference between the two activities is the extent of the analysis that is undergone-how far we descend, as it were, into the conceptual bedrock. As already discussed, to determine whether a given conception comprehends another conception, we must analyze the latter conception in order to determine whether, when it is compounded back together from genus conceptions, it is constituted by the former conception along with others.
However, to determine a thing's nature we must continue this analysis further until we arrive at the most basic mental constituents out of which all conceptions are composed-what Hobbes calls the "simplest conceptions"-BODY, SPACE, and MOTION. Then we must compound these back together through synthesis to build the original conception out of the simplest conceptions we have discovered.
This more involved role for conceptions-in analysis from a complex conception to simplest conceptions and back to the original conception through compounding in synthesis-can be found in nascent form in (2005, 444) . 24 In Anti-White, the imaginability restriction allows Hobbes to redefine radically being (ens) as "everything that has space, or which can be measured as to length, breadth and depth" (Hobbes 1976, 311) , so that ens and "body" become synonymous.
the mature account in the published version of De corpore (1655), with reference to the earlier works throughout.
Hobbes argues in De corpore 6.4 that the method (methodus) used to achieve knowledge of the causes of singular things first requires analysis from the conception of a singular thing down to simplest conceptions and then synthesis from those simplest conceptions back to the conception of that thing (OL I.61 The conceptions into which Hobbes resolves SQUARE are geometric conceptions, and the way to find "the causes or origin of these" will require further analysis until one reaches simplest conceptions. For
Hobbes, basic definitions in geometry are "explications of our simplest conceptions" (conceptuum nostrorum simplicissimorum; Hobbes 1981, 295; OL I.62) . Take the conception LINE from the example.
Hobbes defines LINE as follows: "a line is made by the motion of a point" (linea fiat ex motu puncti; OL I.63). When we have resolved LINE into the parts of its definition, we have then arrived at simplest conceptions: BODY (point), MOTION, and SPACE. To learn the cause of SQUARE we compound (componere) these back together.
Hobbes's second example is GOLD. We resolve GOLD into the conceptions SOLID, VISIBLE, and HEAVY (OL I.61). These conceptions will have to be resolved further until we reach simplest conceptions.
The conception SOLID (solidum) is a geometric conception, and it is caused by the motion of SURFACE (Hobbes 1973, 126; Hobbes 1976, 53 properties from them, but we cannot know that the nongeometrical properties we discover in analysis are part of that thing's nature. The natures we can know from having examined only a single imagistic conception of single bit of that thing are geometrical, and this is due to our imagistic conceptions representing universal geometric (spatial) properties. Once we discover these universal geometric properties, we name them so that we can remember them.
Nongeometric genus conceptions arrived at by analysis, such as WET or POTABLE, are accidents that are "not common to all bodies" (De corpore 8.3; OL I.93), and as such, they are present at some times but not at others. Water will be water whether potable or not. Indeed, discovering whether some property is part of a thing's nature or is, like color, merely due to our bodies' interaction with it, is a substantial part of Hobbesian natural philosophy. This "decision" about the properties of bodies, Hobbes argues, "is not so easy in physics, where the concern is with the causes of sensible phantasms, which present themselves as the very things of which they are the phantasms and deceive many" (Hobbes 1981, 303; OL I.66) . The conception we have of WATER appears to be such that POTABLE may seem to be part of the nature of water upon analysis. So we must discover "whether a phantasm is [from] matter, or some natural body, or whether it is some accident of a body" (Hobbes 1981, 305 ; OL I.67).
We determine whether a phantasm is from an external body or merely an accident of a body (such as our body) by comparing a given idea, say a conception from a single experience of water, with "the properties of matter and accident, which we have already discovered from their definitions by the synthetic method" (Hobbes 1981, 305; OL I.67 ). When we compare these two ideas, we must see whether the properties in question can be taken away in our mind: "[W]hereas the idea arises, is destroyed, is increased, is diminished, and is moved at our decision, it is certain that it [the phantasm] is not matter but accident" (Hobbes 1981, 305; OL I.67 we can see not only that the two claims are related to each other, but also that taken together, they constitute Hobbes's strongest objection to the Cartesian view of scientific knowledge and the mind.
Hobbes should certainly have articulated and defended these claims better, but given the broad range of Hobbes's works at our disposal, we must reject Descartes's dim view of Hobbes's Fourth Objection.
Hobbes's claim that Descartes fails to distinguish between conceiving and imagination should be understood in light of Hobbes's account of the activity of the mind as conceiving. As we have seen,
Hobbes uses conceiving to describe both the formation of conceptions by the mind and the cognitive power's inspection of those conceptions to learn about the nature of the things in the world that cause them. The following comment from Hobbes's Fourth Objection, which Descartes completely ignores in his Reply, now makes sense: "Even the Peripatetics of classical times taught clearly enough that a substance is not perceived by the senses but is inferred by reasoning" (AT VII.178, CSM II.125). Descartes obviously does not think that the wax's nature is "perceived by the senses," but we should understand
Hobbes's point to be that it is an illegitimate short-cut-the postulation of an uninformative black boxwhen Descartes posits the existence of the intellect and describes its activity by saying that it "perceives" the nature of the wax.
Hobbesian scientific knowledge of a thing's nature requires that, rather than relying on a posited intellect, a correct process of reasoning must be undertaken. So when Hobbes claims that Descartes "has not explained how they [imagining and conceiving] differ," he means that Descartes has drawn a distinction in name only, without providing any of the entities or activities that make up the mechanism of conceiving. For Hobbes, positing the existence of an intellect and claiming that it "perceives" the natures of things is no better than saying that we simply perceive the natures of things by our senses. By providing a mechanism, Hobbes shows how scientific knowledge is mechanically intelligible, something for which the intellect posited by Descartes is too impoverished.
Furthermore, we now see the shortcomings of Descartes's Reply to Hobbes's Fourth Objection.
When Hobbes says "inferences in our reasoning tell us nothing at all about the nature of things, but merely tell us about the labels applied to them" (AT VII.178; CSM II.125), he means that simply examining our inferences in language is worthless. Names are merely tools of convenience that we use to remember what we have discovered through analysis and synthesis. Names by themselves tell us nothing about things in the world. To know a thing's nature, we must inspect the conceptions to which our names refer and then engage in analysis and synthesis. his endeavor to develop a mechanical epistemology and philosophical psychology that will together provide a mechanism for scientific knowledge and make it mechanically intelligible.
